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Abstract
This thesis examines China’s role in the world, specifically from 1990 to 2011. I discuss China’s
arms exports and outward direct investment (ODI) and how these relate with China’s policy
goals. Do Chinese leaders use these two methods as means of gaining long-term, international
hegemonic/ strategic support, or are they related to gaining short-term, domestic economic-based
support? In this thesis, I attempt to look into international political theory (constructivism and
rationalism) and how this applies to China’s current and future ambitions as a world power. I test
this by looking at factors like UN voting, polity IV score, and natural resource exports of
developing countries. In my results, I find that arms exports are linked to UN voting (hegemonic/
strategic goals) and that ODI is linked to the acquisition of natural resources (economic goals).
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Before Deng Xiaoping became the 2nd chairman of the People's Republic of China in
1978, China's GDP fluctuated greatly. In 1958, real GDP per capita grew by 18.3%. In 1961, real
GDP per capita shrunk by 26.6%. During Mao Zedong's leadership from 1949 to 1976, the
United States and the Soviet Union shaped China's foreign policy. Many scholars argue that
Mao's foreign policy was ideologically-based and opposed Western influence. To support this
view, scholars cite Mao’s close adherence to Communist ideals, an early political alliance with
the Soviet Union and closed trade policy towards the pro-democracy, Western nations as
evidence. In contrast, other scholars claim that Mao's policy actually shows economic-oriented
tendencies. They cite China's cautionary economic engagement approach after the "century of
humiliation" (百年国耻) from 1839 to 1949, the Sino-Soviet Split of the early 1960s and
President Richard Nixon's 1972 visit as evidence. Both camps can agree on one thing: China has
made a fast transition from being a laggard to a becoming a global leader. As China’s economy
has continued to develop, its foreign policy has also. The 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China in December 1978 marked a major change in
China's economic policy. Since the "reform and opening up" policy decision was made, China
has enjoyed a consistent, positive GDP growth trajectory. Throughout the 1980s, China attracted
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investment. Gradually, however, it began to increase its outward global presence. Deng
Xiaoping’s use of the phrase “韬光养晦, 有所作为” ("hiding capabilities, biding ones time and
making concrete decisions”) in the early 1990s has served as a guiding principle of Chinese
foreign policy throughout the 90s and 00s. The trouble with this expression is its absolute
vagueness. The direct translation is clear, but the implication is unknown. This raises several
questions for examining the rise of China. What exactly does this phrase suggest about China’s
trajectory as a new global superpower? Does Deng’s vision of China focus on domestic
economic rise or greater ambitions as a global hegemon? This thesis will examine the
development of China’s foreign policy and determine how China’s influence is shaping the
nature of the global trade. More specifically, I will discuss the evolution of China’s arms and aid
policies as they relate to China’s own interests. While China has been a net exporter of arms
since the 1970s, its role as an arms supplier has increased along with its role in the international
system. Today, the People’s Republic of China is the world's third largest weapons exporter and
the fourteenth largest nation for ODI. Thus, China has become a focal point for scholars who
want to define how exactly Deng’s vision of China has transformed in the period since the
1990s. As a "new power" that has potentially begun a shift towards a new “revisionist
orientation”, China has caught the attention of the entire world (Aberg 2014).
Research Question
Is China really using arms exports to foreign nations as a proxy to advance its own
political and ideological objectives? Is it simply trying to bring relative stability to areas from
which it needs to extract natural resources? I want to research this question because it is not just
an important issue for scholars. It is also an important question for the entire world because of
China’s growing role as a superpower. People want to know whether China’s economic growth
6

will make it a stabilizing or destabilizing force in international politics. My research will focus
on an important contemporary battle of international studies theory: ideological interest vs.
economic interest.

Chapter 2: Literature Review
For this literature review, I will examine two competing theoretical frameworks and then
consider how and/or to what extent these concepts apply to determining the end game of Chinese
foreign policy. Why? Through using a debate model, this thesis can help to compare how
China’s current foreign policy relates to other countries and also to understand what this implies
for China role in the world. This thesis will primarily concentrate on the motivations of China as
a supplier of arms and aid but will also consider demand of recipient nations. Constructivists
(ideological-based camp) debate that China’s main foreign policy goal centers on building a new
hegemonic order. Rationalists (economic-based camp) contend that China’s main foreign policy
centers on gaining economic benefits from other countries. Before diving into this debate, I will
first discuss China’s integration into the international system.
Introduction to China’s integration into the international system
To understand China’s current participation in neoliberal institutionalism and commercial
liberalization, it is best to use an example of China’s involvement in global trade organizations
and integration into the international system (Momani 2013). China had a strong presence at the
1944 Bretton Woods Conference. This earned it the fourth largest quota and voting share in the
IMF and World Bank. After the Communist Party expelled the pro-Western Kuomintang
(Republic of China) to Taiwan in 1949, Communist and Democratic nations debated whether the
7

PRC or the ROC should represent China in the international organizations. Throughout the 1950s
and the 1960s, the People’s Republic of China had a limited role in IGOs. On the surface, a lack
of participation seemed like a sign of unwillingness to integrate into the international system. In
reality, China partly isolated itself from foreign influence after the century of humiliation. On the
other side, the West was reluctant to accept the PRC government because of its opposition
towards Communism. The Cold War ideological battle both slowed down the PRC’s global
integration process and helped to shape the current perception that China is reluctant to play a
major role in international institutions. In actuality, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the PRC
used its political and economic influence to coerce other like-minded nations (namely
Czechoslovakia, Finland, Poland, India and Yugoslavia) to support its goal of global integration
and rejection of the Kuomintang government as the representative government of China. On
October 25, 1971, the United Nations General Assembly decided to accept the PRC and reject
the ROC as the official representative body of China. Although this decision marked a milestone
achievement, Beijing’s power in other institutions within the UN was still limited by most
Western nations. The IMF and World Bank, which tended to support pro-democracy
governments, recognized the ROC over the PRC. Despite efforts to keep the PRC out of these
organizations, China finally began to integrate into the international community after the “open
up and reform” policy of 1978 and its acceptance into IMF in 1980.
Constructivism
State ideology as a motive of foreign policy is about promoting collective interests
(distinctive politic al identity, cultural influence and long-term state legacy) over individual
interests (Wendt 1999). Constructivism is a theory that asserts that the main motive of a given
nation’s foreign policy is to spread state ideology, which enables the build-up of hegemonic
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order. Constructivists say that leaders have a ‘logic of consequences’ and conduct a cost-benefit
analysis of foreign policy decisions. They also have a ‘logic of appropriateness’, which is based
on how other states act within the international system. Instead, the state’s evaluation of
“normality” or “abnormality” is a greater determinant (Wendt 1999). Institutionalism or lack
thereof is not important for determining state behavior. If it is normal to export arms or send aid
to a given state, more states will do so. On pages 96-97 of Alexander Wendt’s Social Theory of
International Politics, Wendt writes that the materialism vs. idealism and realism vs. liberalism
debates are not suitable for determining motives of foreign policy. All states seek to some gain a
comparative advantage over other nations. According to Wendt, the constructivist approach is
about the “relative contribution of brute material forces to power and interest explanations”
(Wendt 1999, 94). Wendt refutes the work of Waltz. While Waltz focuses on the derivative of
state policy as a result of anarchic, hierarchic, and hybrid systems, Wendt argues that state
choices are more closely linked with theories made by human behavioral scientists (i.e. Darwin
and Lamarck). Social constructs are greater determinates of state behavior than institutional
frameworks. Therefore, the constructivist approach shares a few basic principles with the
rationalist approach. For example, individual power ambitions exist as an ideal of both
approaches. However, power and wealth is not the end game for the constructivist system.
Instead, overall state power ambitions supersede individual ambitions. In sum, leaders are not
just concerned with keeping office but also want to gain popularity and propagate their vision
around the globe (Wendt 1999).
Constructivist View of Chinese foreign policy
While Wendt’s work does not specifically identify ways in which China’s leaders support
the constructivism approach, other scholars do view China’s current foreign policy strategy as an
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attempt to create a “new norm”. Even China is concerned with the possibility of a China-US
Cold War ideological framework (Howell 2014). However, China’s current foreign policy
rhetoric and practice are also rooted in traditional values developed during the Zhou Dynasty
(1046-256 BC). Now, with the re-emergence of China, tianxia “all under heaven” and
Confucianism have re-emerged as Constructivist-minded concepts which can be applied to
modern Chinese foreign policy.
(In China) the tianxia ideal pre-dated any idea of empire. Its emphasis on Heavenblessed authority, however, led to the realization that this was ineffectual without
power. The centralized bureaucratic empire was then consolidated and it used
Confucian ideology to soften the harsh edges of empire, eventually creating the
model of an emperor-state dressed in tianxia robes (Wang 2013).
The creation of a modern-day tianxia order would require one of two preconditions. Either
Chinese leaders would have to de-emphasize territorial disputes and absolute gains of
natural resources, or leaders of other nations would have to accept China as the dominant
power and allow China to have control debated territories (Carlson 2010). Thus, this
scenario seems unlikely to happen on a large-scale. Yet, it is an important link between
Chinese history and current constructivist theory. Under a modern tianxia system, nations

would first show support for China through policy alignment (UN voting records). In return,
China would send arms and aid to these nations.
Rationalism
Rationalism, unlike constructivism, says that outside influence is unlikely to change a
nation’s foreign policy. Actions are not determined by the status quo definition of what is “right
or good,” or normatively correct behavior. James Fearon uses rationalist, theory to explain state
behavior. First, international conflict happens in front of a domestic public audience; therefore,
citizens are the primary influencers of leaders’ decisions. Second, the decision whether or not to
go to war is not directly linked to state interests or military capacity. Instead, “audience costs” is
10

a stronger determinate variable. Lastly, leaders are concerned with the calculated risk and reward
of foreign policy. Unlike Constructivism, the opinion and behavior of other states is not an
important factor for decision-making (Fearon 1994).
Rationalism is closely linked with leadership survival as the main motive of foreign
policy. There are two basic premises of leadership survival theory. First, leaders want to stay in
power because they feel like they will lose a certain economic and social status by relinquishing
control. Second, leaders in Western democracies traditionally have a much more secure and
prosperous life after finishing their political careers than leaders from other countries (Chiozza
and Goemans 2011). This divide creates a sharp contrast between autocratic and democratic
systems of governance. Even though Chiozza and Goemans have good theories on leadership
survival and war, it is also important to examine how autocratic leaders can keep power under
peaceful conditions. Other scholars explain that state policy is determined by the interests of the
leader in power and that politics consists of three groups: the nominal selectorate, the real
selectorate and the winning coalition (Mesquita, et al. 2002). Previous research also seeks to
explain the ways that autocratic leaders become and remain powerful within a given nation. For
nations using an autocratic system, the number of people that make up the winning coalition is
smaller than for nations using a democratic system (Mesquita and Smith 2008). According to the
rationalist camp, autocratic leaders are mostly concerned with staying in power and do not have a
true “state goal”. Leaders of autocratic governments have two ways of achieving this objective.
1. They can increase the availability of public goods (i.e. more wealth for citizens). Thus, the
domestic economy is a more important factor for maintaining and enhancing autocratic power. 2.
They can decrease the supply of coordination goods (i.e. monitor the internet and suppress
protests).
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Party Selection—Part Rationalism, Part Guanxi
Other scholars look at China’s leadership change as an example of Rationalism in practice.
Deng Xiaoping (1978-1989), Jiang Zemin (1989-2002) and Hu Jintao (2002-2012) were all in
power for about the same amount of time. After Mao Zedong, the political focus of the politburo
changed. Instead of rewarding merit and political loyalty, the system rewarded seniority. The
Chinese Communist Party leadership chooses politicians who will more likely support the
interests of the national economy rather than hardline party politics (Miller 2013). Thus, a
structure was created to stabilize the governance system. Look at the ages of leaders in the years
they became head of state, Deng (74), Jiang (63), Hu (60) and Xi (59). Also, look at the ages of
the current politburo standing committee leaders at the time they assumed office in 2012. The
youngest was 57 and the oldest was 67. There is also a rule which requires officials to be
younger than 68 at the time of politburo selection. In contrast, the United States and many
Western governments have younger officials at higher levels of government. For example, in the
2014 White House Cabinet, there are people who are only in their 40s. Why is this difference
significant? In the United States, leaders can quickly emerge from no-name to household name
status based on election results. In the Mao era, Chinese leaders also could be quickly promoted
or demoted by Mao. In the post-Mao era, Chinese officials realized the need for greater structural
constraints on leaders in the political system. Therefore, two major requirements emerged:
previous economic success and connections (guanxi) with higher-level leaders. Up-and-coming
leaders trying to advance to the politburo level use nationalism and economic growth as a means
of gaining political clout; however, the battle for leadership positions has become increasingly
institutionalized. At the very least, the top-level Chinese leadership is aware of the importance of
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rationalism. If the politburo appoints younger or older leaders to the highest government
positions, this could create unwanted succession problems. By creating this standardized system,
China manages to minimize intra-party divisions at the highest level of government that are
typically associated with autocratic regimes. While current leaders do have a lot of power, their
ability to extend this power is naturally limited by their age.
Changing Views in the Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis
Case Example: Nationalism and Rationalism vs. Constructivism and Guanxi
The 2008 global financial crisis also marks a turning point for Chinese nationalism and changes
in China’s world outlook because of four main reasons. 1. Public opinion’s influence on foreign
policy is increasing. 2. As the government reduced funding for media outlets, these agencies had
to find new methods of attracting consumers. By calling for jingoism, media outlets could make
higher profits. Thus, government officials had less negotiating room on issues like the Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands and South China Sea debates. 3. When both citizens and government officials
began to recognize China’s quick recovery from the 2008 financial crisis and the West’s
continued struggles, there was a sense of national confidence. 4. As consumers around the globe
began to buy less and production in China slowed down slightly, some Chinese migrant workers
lost their factory jobs. Because leaders could not ensure continued domestic growth, private
companies could not easily maintain steady production levels. Thus, the government looked for
ways to maintain economic growth (Zhao 2013 a). Thus, China began to drastically expand its
financial and energy sector investments in developed nations (Meunier 2014). It also had to
continue infrastructure projects, provide ODI, and employ Chinese workers abroad in the
developing world (Scissors 2014).
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Other scholars see China’s increasing role after the 2008 financial crisis as an attempt to
assert a global leadership role. New Chinese-led institutions like the New Development Bank
and the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank are not only a sign of shifting economic power but
also a possible sign of changing hegemonic influence (Chen 2014).

Rationalist Goals Using Constructivist Compliance
It is also worth noting that rationalist goals can also take place under a constructivist,
hegemonic order. One example of this is the implementation of an arms policy that is deemed
appropriate by a hegemon (constructivism) in order to meet domestic economic goals
(rationalism). One current example would be the West’s arms policy towards Saudi Arabia.
Although the United States rhetorically supports democracy and human rights, it also sends arms
and aid to dictators. While it is now an international norm to support Saudi Arabia with arms
(constructivist approach), the primary motive is economic interest (rationalist approach) actually
like-minded leaders in return for favorable oil policy towards the West. In turn, this provides the
West with cheap oil for consumers (rationalist approach). Therefore, the constructivist approach
is not necessarily based on the spread of ideology or human rights. Rather, it is based on creating
norms when multiple nations working in unison towards a common policy. Thus, hegemons like
the United States or China can find a balancing between realism and idealism (Bowman 2005).
Scholars also suggest that China sometimes follows the Western hegemonic order while
also selectively pursuing its own rationalist interests. One example is China’s shift in official
policy towards humanitarian crises. Chinese leaders accepted the “responsibility to protect”
(R2P) policy as a way of showing that China wants to become a “responsible power” and
because the international community viewed it as “the new norm”. The R2P theory, outlined by
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the 2006 UN Security Council Resolution 1674, emphasizes human rights over national
sovereignty. Generally, China emphasizes a foreign policy based on non-intervention. China’s
support in helping to end the Darfur crisis aligns more closely with the ideals of the rationalist
approach because its main motive was to protect its economic interests in Sudan rather than
support any sort of democratization efforts that the West often touts as its major reason for
entering in foreign conflicts (Wu 2009).

Chapter 3: Theory
Autocracy and Foreign Policy
As mentioned in the literature review section, Chiozza and Goemans emphasize that there
are major differences between democratic and non-democratic systems of governance. In
democracies, leaders are chosen by a larger selectorate and regular removal from office occurs
more frequently than irregular removal. In autocracies, leaders are chosen by a smaller
selectorate and irregular removal (i.e. coups) from office occurs more frequently than regular
removal (i.e. end/ beginning of term limits). Although Leaders and International Conflict offers
a compelling comparison and contrast between leadership survival in autocracies and
democracies, it does not offer a look into the different sub-categories of autocratic governments.
Dictators at War and Peace not only expounds upon the work of scholars mentioned in the
literature review but also goes in depth about specific types of non-democratic regimes. Jessica
Weeks categorizes dictators into five major groups (machine, junta, boss, strongman and other).
According to Weeks, China is a machine autocracy. A machine autocracy is similar to a
“traditional autocracy” in the fact that there is still a single, non-democratically selected head of
state; however, the machine autocratic system ensures a greater degree of political certainty
15

through the creation of a fixed political apparatus. Unlike in a “traditional autocracy” where the
leadership transition process usually only takes place when a leader dies or is forced out of
office, leaders within China’s machine autocracy must meet certain age requirements to be
eligible for certain levels of the government. This process creates a natural check on autocratic
power. Although the origin of power within machine autocracies is much different from that of
democracies, leaders in both machine autocracies and democracies share one important common
goal: the maximization of political power. Nations with these two systems are far less likely to
start a war than other regime types (i.e. junta, boss, strongman, etc.), and both have equally low
odds of ending conflicts in defeat. Weeks argues that those civilians who have influence in
machine autocracies often dissuade the top leader from making aggressive, confrontational
foreign policy decisions. As evidence, in the first thirty years of its inception, the PRC was
involved in many conflicts. These include the Korean War (1950 to 1951), Sino-Indian War
(1962), Sino-Soviet border conflict (1969), and Sino-Vietnamese War of (1979). During those
conflicts, China was actually closer to Weeks’ definition of a boss autocracy. After this time, the
Chinese government began a transition towards becoming its present-day machine autocracy
system (Weeks 2014). In the thirty five years since then, China has not been involved in any
considerable skirmishes or conflicts.
Using this historical perspective, it is becomes clearer to see recognize current Chinese
leaders seek and maintain power. Although Weeks does create a more sophisticated framework
for the analysis of autocracies and their usage of war as a means of political survival, a new
question now arises. How do Chinese leaders obtain and maintain political power despite not
being involved in any major international conflict during the timeframe of my data analysis
(1990 to 2011)? *Note: that data is limited according to when nations gain independence and/ or
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general availability of statistics. *Note: Data becomes more available over time; therefore, data
prior to the 1990s is scarce. To look specifically at how China has operated under the machine
autocracy governance system, I will identity the influencers and decision-makers. To further the
work of Weeks and other scholars, I will research beyond the traditional framework of dictators
and direct involvement in war. Even with a reluctance to engage in conflict, Chinese leaders still
must use other means of maintaining power. Oftentimes, arms exports are viewed as a proxy for
direct military engagement abroad. Similarly, foreign aid can be viewed as a method of
advancing international development interests, which in turns helps China’s domestic economic
interests. By sending arms and aid to certain countries, top-level Chinese leaders avoid pressure
from influential civilians who oppose conflict and also provide the nation’s elite with what they
want the most: resources and monetary wealth.
Keeping the Social Contract: China’s Political and Economic Reforms
Before considering Chinese domestic politics and its effect on foreign policy during the
timeframe of this research, it is essential to recognize the important changes that have taken
place in the PRC since it was founded in 1949. The idea of a social contract between government
and citizens is popular in Western philosophy. Now, in modern China, officials are using a
rationalist approach to maintain the social contract (Nathan et al. 1999). According to
rationalists, citizens and leaders both seek personal, tangible and short-term benefits. The only
major difference is that these two groups work within different parameters. Leaders at all levels
of government are concerned with maintaining and building their own power within political
office and institutions. Citizens look to build their own power outside of the political sphere. For
government officials, a sense of authority is the basic definition of power. For citizens, material
wealth is the basic definition of power. First, the government ensures the availability of natural
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resources. In turn, these resources provide the foundation of domestic economic growth. Because
citizens perceive their lives as continually improving, they will continue to support the leaders
who provide these resources.

Patterns in Leader Selection
Using the theory of leadership survival and the rationalist approach as a basis for
decision-making, leaders should make foreign policy decisions (i.e. arms exports) congruent with
domestic policy goals. Research shows that both economic success and patronage are both
necessary for political advancement in modern China (Jia et al. 2013). Why are these findings
significant for this research project? Unlike in other autocratic systems, Chinese leaders cannot
rely solely on political connections for career advancement. If lower-level leaders know that
economic growth under their leadership is an essential component of career advancement, they
will focus on implementing pro-economic growth policies over party-based and ideologicalbased policies. Once these leaders are appointed to positions on the politburo where they have
control over country-level policy, they will likely continue to view economic success as a factor
for personal career success. Compare this with China under Mao’s leadership. According to the
categorizations of autocracies, Mao would be considered a personalist leader of a boss autocracy
(Weeks 2014). For career advancement, political connections to the top leader are far more
important than economic growth under this type of autocracy. If foreign policy goals are
congruent with domestic policy, arms exports of the Mao era likely support strict adherence to
ideological principles. For example, Chinese aid during the 1950s and 1960s supported African
independence movements. In the 1970s, China began to become a leader of the developing world
(Dreher and Fuchs 2012). The post-Mao era shift away from rigid adherence to ideology led the
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national government to favor economic interests over ideological interests. As the economy
began to grow and diversify, Chinese leaders saw a need to build the capacity of the private
sector. With a lack of domestic natural resources, the government had to look towards foreign
markets to meet consumer demand (Zhao 2013 a). After many aspects of the national economy
changed from public to private control, more citizens gained economic prosperity. In turn, the
nature of influence also changed. Even though decision-making power was and still is
concentrated within the politburo, the notion of government officials holding accountability and
meeting the needs of citizens (or at least the elite class) is becoming increasingly important. As
citizens gain more wealth, they also develop more influence over the decision-makers. Who has
influence in modern China? The modern Chinese class system consists of nine tiers.
Realistically, only Tiers 1-3 (fewer than 6,000 people) either have direct influence of public
opinion or hold decision-making power. Tier 4 (5 to 10 million) potentially has indirect
influence. While this seems small for a nation of over 1.35 billion people, the percentage of
people with influence has actually grown significantly since the beginning of economic reforms
(Lu 2014).

Arms Exports
Bureaucratic Process of Arms Exports
The rationalist theory can be expanded to understand the rationale for arms exports.
According to rationalist theory, leaders will look at domestic public opinion to determine which
nations receive arms. If State A’s citizens think State B is weak or not a threat to State A, leaders
of State A will carry out policy X (Slantchev 2004). For example, the Chinese government, with
weak polarization of domestic opinion on this issue, can sends arms to nations in Africa
(regardless of regime type) even with pressure from the international community (Hanauer and
19

Morris 2014). Conversely, the public would have a stronger polarization of support or rejection of

a similar arms deal with a nation that could possibly challenge China’s short-term interests.
Thus, the ultimate decision of whether or not to export certain arms is based more on short-term
calculated risks involved with obtaining natural resources rather than long-term state security and
leadership security (Brown and Marcum 2011).
Within the timeframe of this research, the Chinese military-industrial complex has
undergone major changes. These changes often coincide with national economic restructuring.
The “opening up and reform” of 1978 and the movement towards a “socialist market economy”
in 1993 were policy changes made at Third Plenum conferences, which take place every five
years (one year after National Congress meetings determine leadership changes). In 2008,
COSTIND merged with several other agencies. It was placed under the control of the State
Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND).
SASTIND was placed under the control of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology
(MIIT) as a new bureau under the control of the State Council. Despite the government’s
transition from a direct arms manufacturer towards a supervisor of private and state-owned
enterprises that make weapons, the decision-making process is still ultimately controlled by the
under the supervision of the Central Military Commission (CMC) (Li 2012). With the exception
of Deng Xiaoping, the Chairman of the CMC has always assumed the role of Party Secretary of
the PRC. Unlike in the US or other democratic nations, the top leader of a machine autocracy
still has control over much of the important foreign policy decisions. In China, the power of the
top leader is actually expanding. At the Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congress in 2013, Xi
Jinping became chairman of the newly created National Security Commission. In addition to
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control of foreign policy, President Xi now has greater control in domestic security policy
(Tiezzi 2014).
2015 Arms Exports Decision-making Hierarchy

*Figure 3-1
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Objections to Multilateral Arms Control Policymaking
In July 2012, China played an important role at the UN Resolution 61/89 negotiating
conference. UN Resolution 61/89 is commonly known as the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) was
adopted by consensus in April 2013, but China abstained from voting. This is part of a Chinese
strategy to remain neutral on issues that Chinese government deem unfavorable but does not
want to express direct opposition associated by the casting of a “no” vote (Johnston 2008). This
can be seen on other votes like the UN decision of action against Saddam Hussein in the Gulf
War and the UN decision to declare the Crimea referendum invalid. Although this appears
merely to be a way of showing silent support for autocratic legitimacy, the systems of
government within Iraq and Russia were not the real reason for China’s decision to abstain from
voting. In these two cases, China’s objection under the rationalist approach can be viewed as
attempts to maintain good relations with the nations being sanctioned by the international
community in an attempt to obtain more resources made available by the decrease in exports
from the sanctioned nations to pre-sanction bilateral trade partners. In the case of the ATT,
China’s decision to abstain from voting also stems from a desire to protect its own economic
interests rather than an ideological disagreement. Under the rationalist approach, its objections
can be viewed as an attempt to protect the status quo of its current trade procedures and to
maximize its ability to obtain natural resources through the use of arms exports rather than direct
military involvement. Although China did express early objections to clauses increasing
humanitarian arms control and promoting human rights (perceived to be an ideological
opposition), it lightened its stance after many African countries expressed interest in these
regulations. Instead, China drew two hard lines during the negotiation process. 1. It did not want
Regional Integration Organizations (RIOs) to be included because of the EU’s arms trade
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embargo on China. 2. China did not want arms transfers as gifts to be included in the resolution.
For dual-use goods, the international regulations are highly developed and established through
legal resolutions. In this area, China is considered to adhere to the current rules. For conventional
arms, few regulations exist. Only UN trade embargos act as international control measures.
Because all of China’s conventional arms exports are manufactured by SOEs, China has been
reluctant to join groups like the Wassenaar Arrangement or signed agreements like the ATT
because they call for the Chinese government to reveal its arms exports policy mechanisms
(Bromley 2013). Even though China continues to be unfavorable towards the idea of universal
human rights, this reaction can be viewed as an economic-based, rationalist and pragmatic
response rather than a purely ideological objection. Therefore, an objection to human rights
policy was not a major factor in China’s decision not to vote.

Economic Aid
China’s ODI policies also indicate a movement towards rationalism. The percentage of ODI
directed towards natural resource exploration increased in the post-2000 era; however, this
percentage was lower in 2005 than in 2001 (Cheung and Qian 2009). Even though this suggests a
de-emphasis on the role of natural resources, it does not consider the fact that many resources
could have already been discovered. Thus, the focus has changed from resource exploration to
resource extraction and infrastructure development for nations where natural resources were
found. In terms of economic aid, China is also more likely to send aid to countries that do not
pose any threats to Chinese security and where it has it can receive a return on investment,
mainly through bilateral trade. Trade volume between China and African countries went from
42.82 million USD in 2007 to as much as $250 million in 2013 as China has continued
to emphasize this opportunities of this win-win situation (Zhang 2015). Chinese Ministry of
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Commerce (MOFCOM) is in charge of dispersing bilateral aid. This suggests that commercial
purposes drive China’s investment strategy (Lammers 2007). Although the percentage of ODI
sent by SOEs decreased from 100% in 2005 to 89% in 2011, this slow change towards
privatization of investment flow indicates that China’s central government still had almost
complete control over outward cash flow (China Outward Direct Investment 2015). Prior to
2013, National Development Reform Commission (NDRC), Ministry of Commerce
(MOFCOM), and State Administration of Foreign Exchange all had regulatory power over ODI.
Any ODI project over 10 million USD (natural resource-seeking 30 million USD) had to go
through a time-consuming bureaucratic process. At the Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congress
in 2013, the State Council expanded the administrative powers of provincial governments with
respect to ODI. Now, any ODI project of less than 300 million USD will only be subject to the
recordation filing with provincial governments. This change means that the central government
no longer favors ODI from SOEs over private companies. Instead, it now encourages the
expansion of the private sector (Ma et al. 2014).
There are also a few issues to consider when examining ODI. The major concern is the
limited availability of a centralized aid database for all countries. MOFCOM does provide
statistics regarding Chinese ODI; however, there are many problems related to tracking ODI.
Looking at the top ten recipients list for Chinese ODI, there are a few issues to consider. First,
only one out of the top ten recipients is actually a developing country (Sudan, ranked 10th).
Developed countries can offer opportunities for bilateral trade expansion; however, these
countries are not as useful for examining the role of development aid in exchange for natural
resources. The largest ODI recipient is Hong Kong, a special administrative district that has
belonged to China since 1997. Thus, most scholars exclude this from their analyses of Chinese
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ODI. China’s second and third largest recipients of Chinese ODI are the British Virgin Islands
and Cayman Islands, respectively. These investment locations are often used because they are
untraceable and tax-free. This makes it unclear exactly where these investment end up and for
what purposes. Lack of investment transparency equally or even more for the United States;
therefore, it is difficult to have an entirely accurate comparison of ODI goals between machine
autocratic and democratic systems.

Autocratic Enabler or Resource Seeker?
In some situations, China’s hegemonic influence and economic interest overlap. Still,
scholars still view the advancement of China’s domestic economic interests through extraction of
natural resource extraction as China’s main foreign policy objective (Bromley 2013). Attempts
to illegally sell weapons to Zimbabwe in 2008 and to Libya in 2011 can be viewed as defiance
towards international laws. The central government defended the unsuccessful arms trade deal
with Zimbabwe and denied government knowledge of a meeting between Gadhafi and arms
exports representatives in Beijing. Constructivists would likely explain that these types of trade
deals are part of a strategy to create a new international norm. When looking at China’s bilateral
relationships with autocratic governments such as these from a rationalist perspective, the
reasons behind supporting autocrats becomes clearer. In early 2011, China had seventy-five
companies with fifty construction contracts in Libya worth $18 billion. Chinese oil imports from
Libya reached 4.5 billion in 2010, making up three percent of China’s yearly total (Shinn and
Eisenman 2012). Some scholars argue that China’s main purpose for sending arms exports to
Zimbabwe is to extract mineral deposits (Sachikonye 2012). China’s overall arms strategy is not
just focused on propping up like-minded dictators. Rather, it is most interested in resource
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extraction. In order to do this, China tries to ensure the domestic stability of partner nations.
Moreover, China also supports democratic leaders in resource-rich developing nations. For
example, in 2010, Zambia announced it would further its military ties with China. These
meetings have continued annually since then. The Chinese media emphasizes the importance of
Zambia’s support of China’s core interests such as the “One China Policy”, Tibet, Taiwan and
human rights policy (China National People’s Congress 2010). However, China’s military
cooperation with Zambia is not just about gaining support for ideological interests. Zambia is the
world’s fourth largest copper exporter and China is the world’s largest copper consumer. From
2011 to 2013, Zambia attracted the most Chinese investment of any nation in all of Africa
(Thondhlana 2014). These examples show that Chinese arms exports policy and aid policy does
not focus on whether nations have democratic or autocratic governance systems or a good or
poor human rights records. Rather, these decisions are more simply based on the establishment
of cooperative bilateral relationships which can benefit China as a resource seeker.
Arms-- Causes of Regional Cooperation and Conflict
There is one exception to the natural resource extraction and arms exports theory. I
expect China’s relationship with neighboring countries to have a high degree of variation. There
are two main theoretical reasons for this expectation. China’s border disputes can be divided into
two categories: land and sea (Zhao 2013 b). There are two main differences between these
nations. 1. Demarcation lines of land territory between China and its neighbors have been mostly
resolved since the late 1990s. In contrast, nations located in the East China Sea and the South
China Sea are still in debate with China over ownership of sea territory, much of which
potentially contains a high amount of petroleum. Therefore, China views its land neighbors as
emerging trade partners and its sea neighbors as competitors for natural resources.
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2. The ownership of shipping lanes is also a reason for competition with sea neighbors.
Even if natural resources on the ocean floor are scant, the seas are an important area of
transportation of natural resources. The Chinese government has taken a series of measures to
avoid over-reliance on shipping across the Malacca Strait; however, eighty percent of Chinese oil
imports are still shipped across this area, which is controlled by Indonesia, Malaysia and
Singapore (Zhao 2013 b). Since the focus of Chinese leaders has shifted towards of foreign
natural resource value of foreign lands, regional trends should also drive the Chinese arms
exports decision-making process. For example, previously, China would send arms to rogue
leaders in nearby states like the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia during the 1970s. Now, however, the
natural resource worth of a particular nation seems like a more realistic determinate of arms
exports. Furthermore, only ten percent of Chinese arms exports are transported using Chinese
ships. This is vulnerability for China’s energy security. Thus, China would not theoretically send
arms to nations with which it has the potential for future competition or conflict.

Chapter 4: Hypothesis
The debate between Constructivists and Rationalists is important to modern-day study of
the international system and its actors. Various scholars try to build theoretical foundations to
explain the decision-making process and results. After carefully examining the scholarly
literature, I have derived the following hypothesis: there should be a positive correlation between
Chinese arms exports/ aid and resource imports. I expect the quantitative analysis in both cases
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to closely reflect the rationalist theory. Despite the fact that China appears to have developed a
highly structured framework to limit the power of government officials and create smooth power
transitions, leaders at all levels of government are still need domestic support as the basis for
maintaining control and advancing within the party. As a result, individual leaders will look
towards quantitative sources (i.e. national GDP, wage increases) and qualitative sources (i.e.
standard of living, nationalism) of legitimacy. This means that leaders must support various
types of governments that are already in place throughout the world. Even though actors like the
United States and other established powers do challenge China to assert itself as a revisionistminded state, I predict that China’s response to challenges on issues like human rights and good
governance, China will not simply rely upon support from like-minded leaders. As the
aforementioned scholars have mentioned, China has adopted the Right to Protect, known as R2P,
theory and subsequent UN resolution, but it has actually only applied the support of R2P in
places where resource-extraction is already high and where further destabilization would lead to
a reduction in economic cooperation. By diversifying arms exports and aid to nations with
various regime types and human rights records, China has valued the short-term, more tangible
gains over the long-term, less tangible gains.

Arms— Non-Regional Cooperation/ Non-Cooperation
Within the 1995 to 2012 era, I expect China’s arms to be diversified and based on the
presence or lack thereof of natural resources that are vital towards economic growth. Due to
China’s lack of domestic natural resources, it must look towards other nations that have abundant
resources. Therefore, I expect a non-regional nation with oil, minerals and other vital possessions
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will generally receive more arms from China than a non-regional nation that does not possess
resources.

Arms— Regional Cooperation and Conflict
According to the rationalist approach, China will not necessarily support regimes within
the Asia-Pacific region which have similar political and ideological beliefs. Instead, Chinese
arms exports should show a decrease over time to both autocratic and democratic leaders of
regional, resource-competing neighbors as the need for economic growth began to play a greater
role in political advancement within China. If China views resources as attainable under its own
direct control, it will not try to cooperate with states which also try to hold claims to these
resources. China has no room to dispute over resources that lie within another county’s economic
and political domain. Instead, leaders can only legitimately argue for control over areas which
have yet to have any official international recognition of belonging to a particular nation. Thus,
Chinese leaders realistically view oceanic neighbors in the East China Sea and the South China
Sea as either direct threats to control over or mutual use of oil resources, which would hinder
China’s economic interests.
Chinese Aid
Because ODI data is limited mostly to African countries, I exclude the Asia-Pacific intraregional hypothesis from my analysis of Chinese aid policy. Although China has ODI in almost
every African country, I expect that this is due to the overall demand for development across the
entire continent. I predict that China does not view its economic aid policy in non-regional states
as a way to promote the formation of hegemonic power. Instead, I expect that Chinese ODI
favors resource-rich countries over resource-poor countries. Therefore, this hypothesis aligns
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with the rationalist approach that Chinese aid policy reflects the interests of the domestic
audience. In sum, China’s aid policy reflects its need for natural resources from recipient nations,
which indicates an emphasis of economic benefits over ideological/ strategic interests.

Chinese Arms Exports Hypotheses
Geographic Domain,
Economy Characteristic
Regional (Sea),
EEZ overlap with China
Regional (Land),
Resource-Rich
Regional (Land),
Resource-Poor
Non-Regional,
Resource-Rich
Non-Regional,
Resource-Poor

Status of Bilateral Relationship

Significant Arms Trade?

Competitive

No

Cooperative

Yes

Neutral

No

Cooperative

Yes

Neutral

No

*Figure 4-1
Chinese Outward Direct Investment Hypotheses
Geographic Domain,
Economy Characteristic
Non-Regional,
Resource-Rich
Non-Regional,
Resource-Poor

Status of Bilateral Relationship

High level of ODI?

Very Cooperative

Yes

Somewhat Cooperative

No

*Figure 4-2
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Chapter 5: Research Design
Testing the Hypothesis
To test the hypothesis, I employ a time-series cross-sectional analysis of Chinese arms
exports and aid to developing nations from 1990 to 2011. I use a variety of variables related to
arms exports, political, economic and military structures to run quantitative analyses.

Scope
For this research, I will look specifically at Chinese arms exports and aid to developing
nations. To categorize and separate developed nations from developing nations, I filter out
nations which are members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD). This organization began in 1961 with twenty member states. Since then, it has
expanded to include thirty-four countries. Almost all of these nations are considered to be
developed nations. For this thesis, I examine the role Chinese foreign policy plays in the
developing world. For nations which were not initially member states but later became member
states, I include data up until the year before they joined the OECD. I exclude the OECD
member countries because they are more likely to be arms exporters themselves and less reliant
upon foreign aid for economic growth. Thus, their respective foreign policy strategies are less
likely to be directly influenced by Chinese arms exports and aid policies.

Dependent Variables
Chinese arms exports from 1991 to 2011 serves as the first dependent variable in this
analysis. Because this is an absolute value, I log the Chinese arms exports variable. I have
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chosen arms exports as a dependent variable because this represents a theoretical means of
achieving foreign policy goals. Although it would be ideal to look at changes in Chinese arms
exports policy starting from an earlier period of time, some important World Bank Development
Indicators are only available from 1990 onward. For data, I use the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) arms transfers importer/ exporter trend-indicator (TIV)
values. Instead of using the actual price point of weapons, SIPRI TIV is based on the actual
numbers and types of weapons sold. For example, if China sells the same number of comparable
arms at a lower price point than the United States does, TIV list both as equal values. Thus,
inconsistencies in elasticity of demand and nominal currency changes are removed from the
equation. This makes SIPRI TIV a reliable and consistent dataset for using arms exports as a
dependent variable.
Next, Chinese ODI from 2000 to 20011 serves as the second dependent variable of this
analysis. Because this is an absolute value, I log the Chinese ODI variable. Although China did
send economic aid prior to 2000, data is unavailable before this time period from a centralized
source. In previous research regarding aid, scholars have had to compile data from various
databases. To simplify this process, I use AidData’s Chinese investment dataset. Because this
dataset includes mostly sub-Saharan nations, I will not be able to test the cooperationcompetition theory regarding aid’s usage in the Asia-Pacific region. However, I can still test
whether aid is dispersed according to China’s potential for natural resource extraction in a given
country. For both arms and aid, I choose 2011 as the end year for the data analysis because this is
the latest year in which all natural resource independent variables are available.
According to the rationalist approach, arms exports and aid statistics should suggest that
China is mostly concerned with short-term, economic interests (i.e. acquisition of natural
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resources). According to the constructivist approach, arms exports and aid statistics should
suggest that China is mostly concerned with long-term, ideological interests (i.e. supporting likeminded leaders of foreign countries, and/or countries that express support Chinese foreign
policy). Alternatively, arms export and aid could also represent demand from certain countries.
In this instance, both the constructivist and rationalist approaches would indicate a null
hypothesis where the broader economic and ideological interests of China are not as essential to
the arms exports policymaking process as the military armament needs of recipient nations.
I also use arms exports and aid as dependent variables to compare the potential
differences between these two methods of foreign policy engagement. Arms exports are
considered to be the more controversial and regulated in comparison to ODI. Therefore, China as
a supplier and recipient nations as consumers likely have different views on what is expected
prior to or after making these two different types of transfers. A given nation is more likely to be
more receptive towards offers of ODI than offers of arms. Likewise, China is more likely to be
more concerned with potential backlashes in arms exports and less concerned with a potential
misuse of ODI. Both dependent variables can help to determine whether China’s emerging image
as a global superpower is driven by its own domestic economic needs or a desire for hegemonic
influence. While Western powers show an inconsistency between rhetorical support of human
rights and a continuation of arms policies that actually favors oppression under autocratic rule,
little is still known about whether China’s foreign policy rhetoric and record align together.

Testing the Rationalist Approach
First, I examine whether arms and aid correlate with natural resources. I use is the oil and
gas value (in 2009$) as the main variable independent variable. To avoid skewed data, I log this
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value. Some limitations on direct representation of the theoretical model do exist. While it would
be ideal to use a statistic like oil and gas exports (by volume), much of this data is missing from
both the World Bank and Michael L. Ross datasets. While the oil and gas value (in 2009$) does
not factor for the possibility of varying degrees of domestic consumption in the country of
production, it is useful to understand oil production as an absolute number. This is a good
indicator of a given nation’s potential for the use of natural resources as a major export
commodity. One potential flaw to oil exports data is that a nation which has oil resources does
not necessarily send most of its oil to China. Also, China might be an arms exports free-rider,
meaning that China could import oil from a given nation which relies upon arms exports from
countries like the United States and Russia instead of China. The unavailability of consist data to
track bilateral oil transactions makes it difficult to get a true correlation between the theoretical
and empirical models.
In regressions 1-5, I use oil and gas value (in 2009$) as an independent variable. In
regression 1 and 5, I include oil rents (% of GDP) and coal rents (% of GDP) as variables to
examine the hypothesis of natural resource-based arms policy across different natural resource
variables. In regression 5, I include mineral rents (% of GDP).
While these three additional variables do not indicate a given state’s overall natural
resource production level, they can be used to determine whether or not China sends arms and
aid to countries with more diversified economies or to those that are more reliant upon natural
resource exports as a percentage of the economy. All four variables are all useful for testing the
rationalist theory as it applies to China’s arms exports policy. If there is a correlation, the
hypothesis that states the domestic audience’s need for economic growth will be supported by
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the data. If there is no correlation, then the evidence is not significant enough to support the
rationalist theory.
Testing the Constructivist Approach
Afterwards, I include a variable with the United Nations General Assembly voting data
(Strezhnev and Voeten 2013). This variable indicates how nations UN General Assembly voting
record compares to China’s voting record. Values of these variables range from 0 to 1. Statistics
closer to 0 indicate dissimilarity, and statistics closer to 1 indicate a similarity. This variable tells
to what extent China uses arms for UN votes as a strategic option for gaining international
support. I use this variable to test the strategic interest of arms exports and aid. Although this
variable does not determine whether recipients share a similar political system with China, it
does help to understand whether China sends arms to nations who express similar international
policymaking. Thus, this variable can be used as a way of testing whether recipient nations
possibly align with China’s hegemonic vision. It is useful because it serves as a politicaleconomic hybrid variable. While it does not directly represent ideological or economic
similarity, it can be used as a measurement of how arms and aid are used to achieve certain goals
of Chinese foreign policy. However, the variable is limited by the fact that arms exports and aid
are not necessarily sent as a part of a re-creation of the tianxia concept mentioned in the
literature review. Instead, UN voting similarity to China could simply be an after-effect of
support for China after arms and aid have already been sent to a given nation. Still, UN voting
infinity data serves as a good variable to test whether China receives any strategic benefit from
exporting arms and sending aid. In regression 3, I use one regression that includes UN voting as
an independent variable and one regression that does not include UN voting to see whether
inclusion/ exclusion of UN voting has an effect on arms exports.
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Then, I use data from the Center for Systemic Peace to add control variables related to
ideology. I use the Polity IV to determine a given nation’s governance system. This variable tests
the constructivist approach that says China is likely to send arms to like-minded leaders with
similar systems of government. This variable tests the hypothesis that a nation with an autocratic
political ideology similar to China was once considered to be a more likely recipient and that
ideology becomes less important over time as the focus of China’s foreign policy has changed
towards emphasizing meritocracy over ideology. I include this variable to see whether any
certain system of governance is an archetypical recipient of Chinese arms. This variable is useful
because it provides a wide scale for determining a given nation’s government type. The Polity IV
score value ranges from -10 to +10. -10 indicates a high-level autocracy and +10 indicates a high
level of democracy. There are also three values (-66, -77, -88) that indicate a period of instability
for a given nation. Because these cases do not provide a clear estimate for a given nation’s
governance system, I label them as “system missing” to avoid incorrectly skewing the data.

Before and After the “Go Out” Policy
Next, I examine whether China’s arms policy has changed over time. To do this, I create
a dummy variable. Arms exports sent before 2000 are labeled with a value of 0. Arms exports
sent after 2000 are labeled with a value of 1. I choose the year 2000 as a control variable for two
main reasons. Although both the “opening up and reform” policy of 1978 and the Tiananmen
Square Incident of 1989 are both examples of turning points away from an emphasis on party
principles and towards economic-based policy, some important data is unavailable until 1990.
Still, 2000 is an important year for examining China’s arms and aid policies because it marked a
shift away from an emphasis on FDI and towards ODI with the passage of the “Go Out” Policy
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(Nash 2012). I expect that this shift not only pertained to investment policy but also towards a
natural resources-oriented arms export policy. I use the time variable as a way to test the theory
that China has transitioned from a constructivist-based foreign policy towards a rationalist-based
foreign policy. In regressions 1, 2, and 3 the “Before or After 2000” variable is simply used to
see if China’s arms exports increase or decrease over time. This variable is useful because it
takes into account the reality that the quality of China’s arms exports are continuously
improving, making them more desirable for potential recipient nations. To examine changes over
time, I compare the pre-2000 and 2000-2011 comparison in regression 4.

Regional Trends
Next, I look at the hypothesis which says that China likely sends many arms to land
border nations because of the presence of pre-established borders and a need for economic
cooperation. Also, I test the hypothesis which says that China likely sends few arms to sea border
nations because of the lack of established borders and a desire for full control of oceanic territory
as well as the natural resources found at the bottom of the ocean floor. To test these theories, I
create dummy variables to analyze China’s arms exports within the Asia-Pacific region. For the
first variable, I give any nation that does not share a land border with China a value of 0. Any
nation that does share a land border with China receives a value of 1. For the second variable, I
look at nations which have a sea border with China. To determine this, I look at claims for
exclusive economic zones (EEZs) in the East China Sea and South China Sea to determine which
nations have EEZ overlaps with China (Sea Around Us Project 2015). I give any nation that does
not share a sea border with China a value of 0. Any nation that does share a sea border with
China receives a value of 1. In regressions 1, 3, and 4, I use this variable as a comparison
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between border and non-border states. This means that all nations are included in these
regressions. In regression 2, I exclude every non-border state from the analysis. Then, I list
regional states into two categories: land and sea neighbors. *Note that Vietnam is listed in both
categories. This provides a more direct comparison between land and sea border neighbors to see
if any variation exists in China’s arms exports policy.

Accounting for Demand
The Center for Systemic Peace also provides a dataset called “Major Episodes of Political
Violence, 1946-2013”. From this dataset, I use two main variables: total civil conflict and total
international conflict. *Note: For each case country, these two values indicate the status of
bordering countries involvement with civil and international conflict, and do not include
information about civil conflict within a case country. Nevertheless, nations which have higher
levels of civil and/ or international conflict surrounding them are generally expected to have a
higher overall demand for arms than other nations which do not; therefore, these variables will
take demand for arms into account. They are important not only because they provide
information to form a potential archetypical recipient of Chinese arms and aid but also because
they can suggest if the relationship between conflict and Chinese foreign policy has changed
focus over time.
The size of a given nation’s military capacity is another important variable that accounts
for demand I use data from the World Bank Development Indicators to factor for military
personnel and military expenditures as a percentage of GDP. Even nations which do not face an
immediate threat of civil or international conflict oftentimes still buy arms as a deterrent of
possible future conflict. Again, these variables are similar to the international and civil conflict
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variables by the fact that they are useful in controlling for expected changes in demand. The
military expenditures variable is important because it is used to control for instances where
nations have larger militaries. To account for the size of national economies, I use GDP per
capita (constant 2005 $). Since this is an absolute value, I log the GDP per capita variable. To
account for changes in reliance on international trade, I include trade (% of GDP), which is a part
of the World Development Indicators dataset. This statistic can help determine if nations which
have an overall higher dependence on trade are also dependent on Chinese arms and aid. Also, I
will use population information provided by Michael L. Ross’ database. I also log the population
variable. This serves as an important control variable because developing nations with larger
populations are expected to have a greater demand for arms and aid.

Chapter 6: Results
Arms Exports
Natural Resources (All Nations in Sample) (Table 1)
There is no evidence to support my original hypothesis that a positive correlation exists
between Chinese arms exports and natural resource imports. For natural resources in regression
#1, two independent variables (coal rents and oil rents) have a negative, significant correlation
with arms exports. One independent variable (log of oil and gas value in 2009$) has a negative,
insignificant correlation with arms exports. Because China has the world’s largest economy and
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the largest population, it is reasonable to assert that it relies heavily upon natural resources. Why
do the results for arms exports not support the rationalist approach?
China’s overall usage and level of foreign reliance upon a given resource are two major
factors that determine the government’s foreign policy towards natural resources. First, it is best
to consider the degree of diversity (or lack thereof) of natural resources needed to fuel economic
growth in China. In 2011, this categorical breakdown includes 69% coal, 18% oil, 6%
hydroelectric power, 4% natural gas, < 1% nuclear, and 1% other renewables (U.S. Energy
Information Administration 2014). Until 2007, China’s domestic coal production met consumer
demand; therefore, coal was not necessarily a natural resource that China had to search for
beyond its borders prior to this time. After this point, coal imports became not just a convenient
addition to the domestic supply to but a fundamental necessity to the short-term sustainability of
domestic economic growth. Even after this time, however, China still produced a large quantity
of coal. In 2012, China produced 47% of the world’s total coal output and used it as a source for
81% of energy production (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2014). China’s emergence
as a coal importer only began in the last four or five years of this data analysis; therefore, the
possibility of observing a reversal of the negative correlation between arms exports and coal
imports is unlikely.
Next, China has been a net oil importer since 1993. Seemingly, there should a link
between arms exports and oil imports; however, there are quite a few reasons to explain why the
correlation between arms exports and oil resources does not support the rationalist approach.
Looking at China’s oil imports by source for 2011, Saudi Arabia, Angola, and Iran are the top
suppliers (US Global Investors 2015). Ironically, the potential usage of arms instead of aid as a
means of obtaining resources is based on the idea that developing countries are more concerned
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with military strength than economic growth. Thus, this would require a paradox between
rationalist theory applied to China as a supplier and non-rationalist theory applied to recipient
nations as consumers. While developing nations often demand a large quantity of arms, these
governments do not always gain and maintain power based on military strength alone. Angola is
one example of this. While Angola did not receive any arms from China during the duration of
this analysis, Angola’s overall reliance upon arms imports is low, especially when compared to
other developing countries. For Angola and other developing nations, short-term economic
growth (rationalist approach) could be the best indicator of a leader’s ability to maintain power.
If the domestic economic situation is relatively good, the possibility of civil unrest is lower. As a
result, the government does not have to rely upon its military strength to maintain power.
Still, for some nations from which China imports oil, there is a heavy reliance on arms
imports. In this situation, China has empirically not been the top choice as a weapons supplier. In
some instances, China is an arms exports free rider. For example in 2011, Saudi Arabia was
China’s largest source of oil imports. China did not provide any weapons to Saudi Arabia.
Instead, the United States provided Saudi Arabia with $1.6 billion in arms (SIPRI 2015). Even in
a nation like Iran where China plays a significant role as an arms provider, Russian arms imports
still far surpass Chinese arms imports.
The non-correlation between arms exports and oil imports can be explained by oil
providers’ overall non-reliance on arms (i.e. Angola) and oil providers’ reliance on other powers
for arms (Saudi Arabia and Iran). The trade relationship between China and oil providers is not
usually simply based on direct monetary transactions. While China does not necessarily use arms
as a source of hard power, it often uses development loans as a substitute method.
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By the end of 2012, Chinese NOCs had secured bilateral oil-for-loan deals with several
countries, amounting to around $108 billion according to FGE. China provided loans to
countries that need capital to extract energy reserves and build energy infrastructure in
exchange for oil and gas imports at established prices. China extended oil-for-loan deals
with Russia, Kazakhstan, Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, Angola, and Ghana and
has had a gas-for-loan agreement with Turkmenistan over the past decade (U.S. Energy
Information Administration 2014).
This information indicates that China uses ODI as its primary method of obtaining natural
resources. For example, loan deals, grants, infrastructure construction projects, and other ODI all
act as supplements to direct monetary transactions of natural resource transactions. This helps to
explain why there is a non-correlation between arms exports and natural resource imports.

Asia-Pacific Regional Comparison (Table 2)
As stated in the theory section, I expected that there should be a change in arms exports
policy to occur between China and its neighbors, depending on their geographic location relative
to China. Does China’s arms exports policy reflect this geographic dynamic? In Table 1, all three
natural resource models show a negative correlation between sea neighbors and arms exports. In
contrast, zero natural resource models show any correlation between land neighbors and arms
exports. Table 1 includes all nations; therefore, nations sharing a sea border with China receive
significantly fewer arms than nations that do not. Land neighbors show no major differences in
arms received when compared to the rest of the world. When directly comparing nations with
land and sea border countries in Table 4, there is no significant correlation between location and
arms exports; however, all other tables do indicate a difference between sea and land neighbors.
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Table 2 is a direct comparison between land and sea border states. All non-border states are
excluded. In Model 2, there is a positive, significant correlation between resource-rich land
neighbors and arms exports. However, there is no correlation between sea neighbors with
resources and arms exports. Still, the theory that location matters as a determinate of arms policy
is supported by the results. Sea neighbors receive fewer arms compared to both land neighbors
and non-border states. In contrast, land neighbors receive many more arms than sea neighbors
and also more than non-border states. Data regarding intra-regional arms exports policy supports
the competition-cooperation theory and the rationalist approach.
With and Without UN Voting (Table 3)
In the data design section, I mentioned that the constructivist approach could potentially
be supported by a positive correlation between arms exports policy and UN voting record. Does
China’s arms exports policy favor nations who support China’s overall world vision? In Table 1,
there is a positive, significant correlation between arms exports and UN voting across all models.
In contrast, there are significant, negative correlations between arms exports and two natural
resource models. In Table 3, I look at whether the inclusion or exclusion of United Nations
General Assembly voting has any effect on the correlation between arms exports and natural
resources. With the exclusion of the UN voting variable, the Polity IV score goes from being
positively significant (trending towards democratic governments as recipients of Chinese arms)
to insignificant. The log of population goes from being insignificant to positively significant;
however, there is no change in the log of oil and gas value. This means that the overall impact
caused by the inclusion or exclusion of the UN infinity voting variable has a minimal change on
the arms exports analysis. As mentioned earlier in the discussion of Table 4, UN voting’s
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importance decreased in the 2000-2011 era; however, it is still a significant, positive factor for
China’s arms exports policy.
While there is a possibility that China sends arms to countries before gaining support in
UN voting and that UN voting could represent a hybrid of economic and political interests for
both China and arms recipients, evidence shows that China does send arms to nations that have
similar world views. In sum, results of these arms exports regressions indicate that China uses a
constructivist approach when choosing where to send arms. There is no support for the rationalist
approach that arms policy has changed according to China’s own short-term economic interests
as an arms supplier.
Before and After the “Go Out” Policy (Table 4)
As stated in the data design section, I use the 1990-1999 and 2000-2011 eras for
comparison because of the implementation of the “Go Out” Policy which began in 2000. In the
theory section, I stated that there should be a change in arms export policy to occur over time as
China’s economy continued to grow. 2000 marks a clear turning point for both China’s official
foreign policy outlook. Has the Chinese government’s decision to change from a predominantly
FDI-focused economy to an ODI-focused economy affected the way it exports arms? In the
2000-2011 era, log of population, log of GDP per capita, and total civil conflict go from
insignificant to positively significant values. Only the total civil conflict of bordering states has
moved from insignificant to positively significant. Only the Polity IV score changed from
positively significant to insignificant. This indicates that, from 2000 to 2011, a nation’s political
system had no impact on whether China’s arms exports policy. While the standardized
coefficient of the UN variable does drop, it still has a positive correlation with Chinese arms
exports. This indicates that China is not as focused on sending arms to nations in return for UN
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votes; however, it still does send a significant number of arms to nations with similar UN voting
records Also, the change towards correlation between arms and civil conflict indicates a general
change in warfare. Most nations are no longer focused on a direct threat of a militaristic
neighboring country. Conversely, leaders are concerned that civil conflicts in other nations will
spill over into their borders, and/or a similar civil uprising will take place within their own
nations.

Outward Direct Investment
Natural Resources and Chinese ODI (Table 5)
Since ODI is an essential part of Chinese foreign policy, it is important to test whether
aid China gives ODI solely based on a given nation’s need for development or based on China’s
need for natural resources. In Table 5, I use the log of Chinese aid as the dependent variable. To
find out whether Chinese ODI correlates with natural resources, I use the same three natural
resource variables as I use in Table 1 (log of oil and gas value, oil rents, and coal rents). I also
include mineral rents (% of GDP). I do this because not only is it important to be aware of
China’s largest overall needs (oil and coal) but also what the nations in AidData’s dataset have to
offer as exports. While the sub-Saharan region does have a few oil-rich nations, more nations
have a larger supply of minerals. Minerals counted in this dataset include tin, gold, lead, zinc,
iron, copper, nickel, silver, bauxite, and phosphate. In 2010, minerals made up nearly 80% of
China’s imports from Africa (The Economist). http://www.economist.com/news/middle-eastand-africa/21574012-chinese-trade-africa-keeps-growing-fears-neocolonialism-are-overdonemore Therefore, the inclusion of this variable is necessary.
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For the log of oil and gas value (2009 $) and coal rents (% of GDP), natural resources do
not have a significant correlation with Chinese aid. These two variables support neither
rationalist nor constructivist approaches. For oil rents (% of GDP) and for mineral rents (% of
GDP), natural resources have a positive and significant correlation with Chinese aid. These two
variables support the rationalist approach that China uses economic aid to obtain certain natural
resources. Another important observation of ODI regressions when compared to arms exports
regressions is the change in correlation with the UN General Assembly voting variable. As stated
earlier, the UN voting variable has a positive and significant correlation with arms exports
regressions, suggesting a constructivist and/ or strategic approach. This suggests that China’s
international support comes either as a pre-requisite or a result of its arms exports policy. For aid,
however, China is does not favor nations who vote similarly in the UN. For oil rents (% of GDP)
and for mineral rents (% of GDP), there is a negative, insignificant correlation between aid and
UN General Assembly voting. For the log of oil and gas value (2009 $) and coal rents (% of
GDP) variables, there is a negative, significant correlation between aid and UN voting. These
results do not support the constructivist theory. This indicates that nations do not view aid from
China as a sign of similar world views. The constructivist approach is likely not supported
because of the fact that the United States and many Western countries who align with the
hegemonic interests of the United States also send aid to Africa. Thus, a country that receives
ODI from China will not necessarily align with China’s world view. This means that there is
likely a perception difference between arms aid both from China as a supplier and also from
foreign nations as recipients.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
While there are limitations of data availability on natural resources, arms exports, and
outward direct investment, I think that this research project gives insight into the motives of
Chinese foreign policy. If I had more time and resources available, I would examine more
specific case studies of countries to which China sends arms and aid. Also, I would do have
included the United States and Russia in a comparative analysis to see whether China employs a
new method as a supplier of aid and arms or simply uses a similar model to these two nations.
What does this research project mean for examining the recent history and future trajectory of
China’s foreign policy objectives? First, China’s aid and arms exports continue to increase.
There is a major difference between the use of arms and aid. While China uses arms to build a
hegemonic order (constructivism), it uses aid to help grow its domestic economy (rationalism).
China also uses a nation’s geographic location to determine how it conducts foreign policy.
While land border states and non-border states are more likely to be recipients of Chinese arms
and aid, sea border states are less likely to receive these benefits. I originally predicted that arms
exports and aid both closely correlate with China’s quest for natural resources. As shown in the
results section, the sharp contrast between these two methods helps to explain how China
simultaneously seeks domestic approval through its ODI and gains international support by
sending arms to nations which have similar UN General Assembly voting records. China often
emphasizes a non-alignment, non-interference foreign policy philosophy. This rhetoric applies
mostly to China’s goal to avoid direct military intervention. On the other hand, China still use
arms exports as a means of indirectly affecting the future of recipient nations. Regardless of
whether arms exports are sent to states that align with China prior to or after receiving arms,
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China generally does expect that arms exports should be accompanied by support for Chinese
foreign policy goals. From a broader perspective, China’s current investments strategy in Africa
could be a positive model for how it extracts natural resources. Although China might contribute
to an increasing amount of global environmental problems, natural resources like oil are an
immediate necessity for China. By using infrastructure projects instead of arms exports as a new
means of obtaining resources, partner nations could experience a more positive future. By
providing infrastructure, China can help to boost global economic development in countries that
traditionally suffered from a lack of basic investment. While results could indicate that China is
potentially favoring non-diversified economies, China’s investment efforts also could signify
more potential opportunities for workers in these countries while also meeting consumer
demands for continued domestic economic growth in China.
The emergence of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is a good example of
how China is re-shaping the way the world looks at ODI. America’s traditional European allies
(UK, France, and Germany) have all entered AIIB to the reluctance of the United States
government. European nations likely view aid from a rationalist approach, especially in light of
the Eurozone’s continued economic recession. While these nations still align with US hegemony,
they see China as the leader of the current global economy and that teaming up with China on
ODI projects could benefit their respective domestic economies. China, however, likely views
AIIB as a way to combine China’s interests in short-term, domestic economic growth with its
goal to increase its long-term hegemonic power in the Asia-Pacific region. While the results of
this research paper do not show aid as a method of gaining hegemonic power, AIIB and similar
organizations like the Africa Growing Together Fund and the New Development Bank could
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lead to a more positive correlation between not only aid and natural resources but also between
aid and UN voting.
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Natural Resources (All Nations in Sample)
Log of Oil and
Gas Value
(2009 US$)

Oil Rents (as
a%
of GDP)

Coal Rents
(as a %
of GDP)

B

Standard
Error

B

Standard
Error

B

Standard
Error

Before or After
2000
UN voting record
compared to China,
"similar or
dissimilar"

*0.111517

0.04764

*0.200351

0.05803

*0.173916

0.05627

*0.621127

0.11794

*0.600880

0.12934

*0.560540

0.12693

Land Border with
China?
Sea Border with
China?
Polity IV Score
Total International
Conflict of
Bordering States

0.02346

0.08333

-0.02936

0.09613

-0.02105

0.09642

*-0.560023

0.13426

*-0.505618

0.14499

*-0.503227

0.14336

*0.011195
*0.065226

0.00437
0.00710

0.00269
*0.084125

0.00557
0.00855

*0.010499
*0.080232

0.00488
0.00840

Total Civil Conflict
of Bordering States

*0.139747

0.02120

*0.150508

0.02507

*0.149727

0.02475

Military expenditure
(% of GDP)

-0.00299

0.00973

-0.00947

0.01110

-0.00983

0.01065

Log of Armed
Forces Personnel

*0.136590

0.03325

*0.218062

0.04213

*0.220145

0.04032

Log of GDP Per
Capita
Trade (% of GDP)

*0.106205

0.03244

*0.091082

0.04010

0.06799

0.03737

-0.00040

0.00057

*-0.001317

0.00066

-0.00122

0.00066

Log of Population

0.05484

0.03720

-0.01096

0.04625

-0.00035

0.04353

Natural Resource
Variable

-0.00571

0.01925

*-0.006128

0.00256

*-0.063988

0.02890

Constant

*-3.712972

0.51506

*-3.345026

0.64424

*-3.345187

0.60004

R Square
Observations

0.211
1843

0.236
1484

.238
1515

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Table 1
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Asia-Pacific Regional Comparison

Land Neighbors

Sea Neighbors

B

Standard
Error

B

Standard
Error

Before or After 2000

*0.457005

0.17967

0.04253

0.12689

UN voting record
compared to China,
"similar or dissimilar"

-0.74731

0.78444

0.93137

1.44635

Sea/ Land Border
with China?
Polity IV Score

*0.967215

0.39460

*1.788011

0.77208

0.02122

0.01147

*0.130351

0.05485

Total International
Conflict of Bordering
States

*0.246482

0.02226

-0.01246

0.02316

Total Civil Conflict of
Bordering States
Military expenditure
(% of GDP)
Log of Armed Forces
Personnel
Log of GDP Per
Capita
Trade (% of GDP)

*1.083454

0.08588

*0.166883

0.05288

0.00935

0.04903

*0.508868

0.12240

0.17144

0.21672

*0.311238

0.14723

0.19587

0.20921

*-0.009318

0.00328

-0.00070

0.00205

Log of Population

*-0.801039

0.13254

-0.37918

0.30448

Log of Oil and Gas
Value (2009 US$)
Constant

*0.370491

0.08549

0.12732

0.13398

3.92811

2.35919

0.88868

7.46001

R Square

0.802

.212

Observations

171

62

Table 2
Model 1

Model 2
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With and Without UN Voting
Model 1

Model 2

With UN
Voting

Without	
  
UN	
  Voting	
  
B	
  

	
  

*0.134576

0.04702

	
  

B	
  

Standard	
  
Error	
  

Standard	
  
Error	
  

Before or After 2000

*0.111517

0.04764

UN voting record
compared to China,
"similar or dissimilar"

*0.621127

0.11794

Land Border with
China?
Sea Border with
China?
Polity IV Score

0.02346

0.08333

-0.06931

0.07924

*-0.560023

0.13426

*-0.449464

0.13232

*0.011195

0.00437

0.00128

0.00400

Total International
Conflict of Bordering
States

*0.065226

0.00710

*0.067544

0.00699

Total Civil Conflict of
Bordering States
Military expenditure
(% of GDP)
Log of Armed Forces
Personnel
Log of GDP Per
Capita
Trade (% of GDP)

*0.139747

0.02120

*0.138614

0.02111

-0.002994

0.00973

-0.00996

0.00967

*0.136590

0.03325

*0.111964

0.03280

*0.106205

0.03244

*0.077771

0.03193

-0.00040

0.00057

-0.00021

0.00056

Log of Population

0.05484

0.03720

*0.073734

0.03611

Log of Oil and Gas
Value (2009 US$)
Constant

-0.00571

0.01925

-0.01010

0.01882

*-3.712972

0.51506

*-2.954009

0.50001

R Square

0.211

Observations

1843

0.189	
  
1890	
  

	
  
	
  

	
  

Table 3
Model 1

Model 2
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Before and After the “Go Out” Policy

Before	
  2000	
   	
  
B	
  	
  
Standard	
  
Error	
  

2000-‐2011	
  
B	
  

	
  
Standard	
  
Error	
  

UN voting record
compared to China,
"similar or dissimilar"

*0.833765

0.17698

*0.395474

0.15621

Land Border with
China?
Sea Border with
China?
Polity IV Score

-0.14770

0.12308

0.04197

0.11305

*-0.637385

0.18718

*-0.516610

0.18741

*0.023529

0.00596

-0.00244

0.00658

Total International
Conflict of Bordering
States

*0.099141

0.00903

*0.025633

0.01136

Total Civil Conflict of
Bordering States

-0.01307

0.03018

*0.256065

0.02939

Military expenditure
(% of GDP)

0.00120

0.01194

-0.01378

0.01631

Log of Armed Forces
Personnel

*0.197335

0.04763

*0.095848

0.04626

Log of GDP Per
Capita
Trade (% of GDP)

0.08862

0.04968

*0.088117

0.04277

0.00097

0.00088

-0.00125

0.00074

Log of Population

-0.01275

0.05170

*0.107212

0.05253

Log of Oil and Gas
Value (2009 US$)
Constant

0.01744

0.02905

-0.02838

0.02530

*-3.571333

0.72953

*-3.410998

0.71964

R Square

.276

Observations

812

0.212	
  
1031	
  

	
  
	
  

	
  

Table 4
Model 1

Model 2
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Natural Resources and Chinese ODI Table 5
Log	
  of	
  Oil	
  
	
  
	
  and	
  Gas	
  
Value	
  	
  
(2009	
  US$)	
  

Oil	
  Rents	
  
(%	
  of	
  GDP)	
  

	
  

Coal	
  Rents	
  
(%	
  of	
  GDP)	
  

	
  

Mineral	
  	
  
Rents	
  
(%	
  of	
  GDP)	
  

	
  

B	
  

Standard	
  
Error	
  

B	
  

Standard	
  
Error	
  

B	
  

Standard	
  
Error	
  

B	
  

Standard	
  
Error	
  

UN voting
record
compared to
China,
"similar or
dissimilar"
Polity IV
Score
Total
International
Conflict of
Bordering
States

*-16.788071

8.016000	
   -21.769872

11.976475

*-‐24.718681	
  

12.097941

-‐14.482000	
   7.873881

-0.078449

0.090000	
   0.047476

0.101353

-‐0.023000	
  

0.105068

-‐0.101000	
  

0.082878

*0.289791

0.104000	
   0.237736

0.126449

*0.293203	
  

0.124085

*0.312222	
  

0.101685

Total Civil
Conflict of
Bordering
States

0.507321

0.432000	
   0.394231

0.443113

0.404000	
  

0.450753

0.526000	
  

0.426586

Military
expenditure
(% of GDP)

0.105639

0.158000	
   -0.074715

0.176125

-‐0.077000	
  

0.176821

0.129000	
  

0.155790

Log of Armed
Forces
Personnel

-0.817626

0.530000	
   0.021336

0.707184

-‐0.030000	
  

0.787020

-‐0.963000	
  

0.521104

Log of GDP
Per Capita

-0.260202

0.522000	
   *-1.871866

0.687272

*-‐1.334480	
  

0.758216

-‐0.049000	
  

0.472392

Trade (% of
GDP)

*0.035885

0.012000	
   0.002534

0.018334

0.025000	
  

0.016191

*0.039808	
  

0.011687

Log of
Population

0.974561

0.615000	
   -0.376216

0.817735

-‐0.022000	
  

0.828905

*1.308062	
  

0.540516

Natural
Resource
Variable

0.222681

0.339000	
   *0.074621

0.030106

-‐0.586000	
  

0.582560

*0.201572	
  

0.069656

Constant

21.750000	
  
0.081	
  
322	
  

12.035969

*56.767239	
   17.151045
0.134	
  
	
  
213	
  
	
  

*12.036000

17.001443

13.404128

10.225958

0.100	
  
219	
  

	
  
	
  

0.104	
  
322	
  

	
  
	
  

Model 2

Model 3

R Square
Observations

Model 1

	
  
	
  

Model 4
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